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Abstract
Traditionally, the government has been the sole entity to enforce anti-piracy mea-
sures. Of late, software vendors are attempting to thwart piracy of their products by
limiting the patch to only legal users. By doing so, the vendor can vertically differenti-
ate the legal copy from the pirated copy since pirates suffer more from hacker activity.
Such an action by the vendor has interesting implications on a vendor’s profit and the
social welfare. In this paper, by constructing a game-theoretic model, we analyze the
economic as well as the policy implications of restricted patch distribution by a monop-
olistic vendor. Based on our analysis, we find that a monopolist does not always benefit
from vertical differentiation. More specifically, in the presence of intense anti-piracy
effort exerted by the government, the vendor does not benefit from complementing the
government’s action with piracy thwarting action if the cost of providing a good quality
patch is high.
In addition, our analysis shows that if the government exerts sufficient anti-piracy
effort, then it is optimal for the vendor to release the patch to all users. One striking
finding of our analysis is that when anti-piracy effort is low, it is welfare improving to
strategically utilize hacking activity through restricted patch distribution.
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1 Introduction
Information security is an important problem for policy makers, businesses, and users.
The estimated loss involving security attacks was around $100 billion in the last few years
(McAfee, 2005; Symantec, 2005). Given the enormity of economic damage and the fact that
vulnerabilities are inherent in a software1, security patches play a crucial role in de-motivating
the hackers.2 A hacker’s motivation to exert effort increases as the number of users increases,
especially as more vulnerable systems are present. This is because the marginal benefit from
exerting effort increases with the number of systems that can be exploited. More specifically,
once the hacker gains access to a system through a specific vulnerability, he can attack all
other systems with that vulnerability at practically no cost. Since piracy leads to a larger
user base, software piracy, perhaps implicitly, has important implications for information
security.
Lately, software vendors have tried to mitigate piracy by authenticating a system before
offering security patches (Png et al., 2006). One prominent example of such practice is Win-
dows Genuine Advantage.3 This practice, essentially, vertically differentiates the legitimate
copy from the pirated copy. However, the strategic implications of such an action are not
obvious.
The conundrum is whether or not a software vendor should make security patches avail-
able to pirates. On the one hand, if pirated systems are not patched, they attract more
hacking which has implications for legal users. On the other hand, if pirated copies are
also supported with security patches, this cannibalizes the demand for legal copies. While
the software vendor can generate demands for legal copies through vertical differentiation
(achieved by restricting availability of the patch to only legitimate users), the government can
1Arora et al. (2006) discuss why a vendor may have incentives to release a buggy software and patch it
later.
2In this paper, we focus on unethical hackers who attack users with malicious intents. For brevity, we
simply refer to them as “hackers”.
3Under this scheme, Microsoft checks for legitimate copies of Windows before allowing downloading any
updates or patches. See http://www.microsoft.com/genuine/downloads/whyValidate.aspx for more details.
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also exert anti-piracy effort4 and increase the demand for legal copies . Therefore, another
question is whether or not the government should exert anti-piracy effort in the presence of
restricted patch distribution mechanism, and is it: the more the better?
The primary question addressed in this paper is, what is the strategic implication of
a vendor’s active role in thwarting piracy. Furthermore, we offer key insights with regard
to welfare implications of such action. From a policy maker’s perspective, understanding
the implications of a vendor’s active role in thwarting piracy – restricting access to patches
to only legal users – is crucial. It is not ex ante if it is welfare improving to complement
the vendor’s action with anti-piracy effort. If indeed the restricted patch distribution is a
substitute of the government’s action (i.e., improves social welfare), then the government
does not need to exert any anti-piracy effort. If, however, restricted patch access decreases
the welfare, then policy makers need to resort to appropriate regulations that may achieve
the desired objective.
One striking finding of our analysis is that when the anti-piracy effort is low (may be due
to high cost), it is welfare improving to strategically utilize hacking activity through restricted
patch distribution. We observe this counterintuitive result because the countervailing effect
of a hacker’s action incentivizes the monopolist to help legal users generate higher surpluses.
In this case, the effect of vertical differentiation achieved through restricted patch distribution
dominates the adverse effect of hacking.
Another surprising result is that a monopolist does not always benefit from the vertical
differentiation. Although it might be reasonable to expect that the vendor always benefit
from quality differentiation obtained through restricting access to the patch to only legal
users, we find that it is not true for the high cost of patch quality in the presence of in-
tense anti-piracy effort. This result is due to the dominance of the adverse effect over the
countervailing effect of hacking.
We also find that there exists an anti-piracy effort level above which it is optimal for
4In this paper, we refer to government’s action against pirates as “anti-piracy” effort. Note that the
vendor’s action to thwart piracy is denoted separately in the form of restricted patch distribution.
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the vendor to distribute patches to everyone. In this case, complementing the government’s
anti-piracy effort with the vendor’s effort reduces legal user’s relative willingness to pay
compare to the case where only government’s anti-piracy action is utilized to obtain quality
differentiation.
This paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review the extant literature most relevant to
this topic. In the following section, we describe our model. In §4, we present our equilibrium
analysis and compare the two policies - giving the patch to everyone or giving the patch
to only legal users. Social welfare implications are discussed in §5. Finally, we present our
concluding remarks in §7.
2 Literature Review
This paper overlaps two different research streams, information security and piracy. Infor-
mation security is not only a technical problem but also an issue of economic incentives
(Anderson, 2001). There are a number of papers that focus on the economic aspects of
information security. Gordon et al. (2003) demonstrate how incentive issues surrounding
information sharing in Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISACs) are similar in spirit
to those in trade associations. They highlight the impact of information sharing on security
investment and information security. They also provide insights regarding free-riding, which
potentially poses serious challenges for information sharing. Relatedly, Gal-Or and Ghose
(2005) focus on the competitive implications of sharing information about security breaches
and security investments. Their results highlight how information sharing complements secu-
rity investment. Gordon and Loeb (2002) analyze an economic model of information security
investment. Their analytical results contend that the optimal level of information security
spending does not always increase with the expected loss from attacks. Also, the level of
security spending needs to be a small fraction of the expected loss from attacks. Cavusoglu
et al. (2005) discuss the value of implementing Intrusion Detection Systems within firms.
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Many papers have focused on analyzing different incentives involved in discovering, dis-
closing, and patching vulnerabilities. For instance, Arora et al. (2004) provide an economic
decision-making framework for disclosing vulnerabilities. They show that vulnerability dis-
closures expedite the response from large vendors and subsequently benefit software users.
Also, a passive CERT-type mechanism almost always generates better social outcome in
comparison to a market-based mechanism for vulnerability disclosure (Kannan and Telang,
2005). Arora et al. (2006) have shown that when a market is big, a producer is better-off
releasing a buggier software early and patching it later. In addition, the researchers suggest
that, in the presence of competition, a vendor offering high value to customers is better off
releasing a buggier product early. This stream of research suggests that most of the software
released are vulnerable and need patching for appropriate security. As a result, any pol-
icy regarding security patch distribution has significant implications for users, vendor, and
welfare.
Recently, August and Tunca (2006) consider users’ incentive to patch security flaws.
They find that subsidy based patching policy performs better than mandatory or tax based
patching policy. They contend that the more users patch the system the better it is for
the overall network security. They suggest that by making patching cost low (by making
it easy for users to patch and providing reliable patch), a vendor or social planner can
improve network security. However, the authors do not consider the strategic interaction
among piracy, hacking, and the vendor. In this vein, Png et al. (2006) consider the strategic
interaction between end-users in taking security precautions, and interaction between end-
users and hackers. But, their work do not focus on the economic and policy implications of
piracy on the interaction among end-users, hacker, and vendor.
Most prior work on software piracy analyze the impact of piracy on legitimate producer’s
sales and profit. A common consensus is that a producer may have the incentive not to
eliminate piracy from the market (Chen and Png, 2003; Gopal and Sanders, 1997; Shy, 2001).
Piracy generates network externality benefits which lead to increased demand for legitimate
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version (Conner and Rumelt, 1991; Shy, 2001). In addition, a monopolist can commit not
to decrease price in future and enjoy increased profit (Takeyama, 1994). In the similar vein,
Varian (2000) argues that sharing or copying information goods can lead to increased profit
for a producer if the transaction cost of sharing is lower than the marginal cost of production.
Further, he argues that when sharing paves the way to distinguish between high-value and
low-value customers, a producer’s profit increases. The stream of research on piracy has also
examined social welfare implications, and the results are typically inconclusive. Generally,
strict rules to combat piracy increase the producer’s profit while reducing the benefits of
utilizing already developed products (Chen and Png, 2003). Chen and Png (2003) contend
that from the social welfare perspective, it is better to manage piracy through price cuts
than strict enforcement. The natural question that arises is what the is welfare implication
of managing piracy through restricted patch distribution. The current paper attempts to
address this question.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has addressed specific issues discussed in the
introduction. Despite the strategic interaction among piracy, hacking, and patching, policy-
makers and vendors are left with very little guidance. Subsequently, our paper attempts to
fill the void in the literature by analyzing the economic and policy implications of restricted
patch distribution.
3 Model
Our model involves four participants, an anti-piracy agency (also referred to as the govern-
ment), a software vendor, a hacker, and software users. We investigate the problem in the
context of a monopolistic software vendor. The sequence of moves in our formulation is as
follows. First, the government chooses the anti-piracy effort level. Then, the vendor decides
on both the price and the patch quality, as well as whether or not to make the patch available
to the pirates. Subsequently, the hacker exerts an effort level to attack the systems and the
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users decide to pirate or purchase the software.
We denote the effort exerted by the government by α ∈ [0, 1]. Here, α = 0 implies that
the government does not exert any anti-piracy effort, whereas α = 1 represents complete
piracy elimination by the government. Let p be the price and x ∈ [0, 1] be the patch quality
set by the vendor. In our model, x = 1 denotes that patch is of the highest quality and able
to deter the hacker’s attack with certainty. We assume that the vendor always provides the
patch to users who have purchased the software. His decision to limit the access to the patch
information is represented by z ∈ {0, 1}. Here, z = 1 denotes that the vendor makes the
same patch information (including the patch itself) available to all users, even to the pirating
users. On the other hand, z = 0 denotes that the patch is only available to legal users. For
the hacker, the effort exerted to attack the systems is the decision variable. Specifically, we
let that variable to be β or the probability of finding a vulnerability. The users, as mentioned
earlier, have the option to pirate or buy the product.
We assume that software users are heterogeneous in terms of the intrinsic value they
derive from the software. We let the user type, θ ∈ [0, 1], be distributed according to a
distribution F (θ). Normalizing the total number of software users in the market to one is
without the loss of generality. We also assume that the intrinsic value of the software is θ2i for
a software user of type θi. This assumption is similar to that in Kannan and Telang (2005).
This value diminishes as the hacker gains access to her machine. If β is the effort exerted by
the hacker and x is the quality of the patch, then β(1 − x) represents the probability with
which a machine is compromised due to the hacker’s effort. The expected consumer surplus
for type θi from buying the legal software is
CSb(θi) = (1− β(1− x)) θ2i − p. (1)
Note that the legal user’s expected loss incurred from a successful breach depends on
the hacker’s effort and the patch quality since we assume that the vendor always makes
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the patch available to the legal users. In the above expression, the following condition will
be required: ∂CSb(θi)
∂β
≤ 0. It implies that as the effort exerted by the hacker goes up, the
consumer surplus decreases. Also, we require that ∂CSb(θi)
∂x
≥ 0. This implies that as the
patch quality improves, the consumer surplus increases.
We let the pirated product to be an inferior but vertically differentiated substitute for
the legal version. The vendor achieves the vertical differentiation by controlling the patch
availability z. As a consequence of this control, the probability with which the machine is
compromised increases. We represent the probability that a pirated software is compromised
by β(1 − xz). In this expression, when z = 1, no vertical differentiation is achieved by the
vendor whereas z = 0 makes the pirated product inferior. Additionally, the government’s
anti-piracy effort also decreases the utility by a factor of (1 − α). It can be interpreted as
the probability with which the pirated user may be subject to legal actions. Assuming that
the cost for the pirated version is zero, the consumer surplus for type θi from pirating is:
CSp(θi) = (1− β(1− x z)) θ2i (1− α). (2)
In this expression, when z = 0, the probability with which the hacker gains control of
the machine is equal to β . In other words, if the vendor controls the patch availability more
tightly, the utility for the pirated copy decreases. Note that when the vendor makes the patch
available to everybody z = 1 and when the government does not exert any anti-piracy effort
α = 0, utilities from both the legal and the pirated versions of the product are identical.
Also, notice that α serves to vertically differentiate the legal version from the pirated version
independent of the value of z, whereas β serves to vertically differentiate when z = 0.
Let θ¯ be the user type who is indifferent between pirating and buying the software. By
equating (1) and (2), the indifference type computed to be
θ¯ =
√
p√
α− αβ + β x− (1− α) β x z . (3)
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Type θi > θ¯ will purchase the software. The rest of the users pirate.
3.1 Hacker’s Profit
In this section, we characterize the hacker’s expected profit function. Similar to Kannan
and Telang (2005), we assume that the hacker’s gain from attacking is less than the loss
incurred by the user. Let the hacker gain θi from successfully breaking into the system of
user-type θi. The success of breaking-in is different between the pirated users and the legal
users. Recall that with probability (1−x) the legal users are protected from hacker’s effort β.
Subsequently, the probability of a successful break-in is simply β(1− x) for the legal users.
On the other hand, the probability of breaking into the pirated versions of the machines
increases if the patch availability is restricted to the legal users. Specifically, β(1 − x z) is
the probability that the hacker breaks into the pirated machine when he exerts an effort of
β. If the hacker’s cost is C(β), the hacker’s objective function is maxβ Πh, where Πh, the
expected profit for the hacker is:
Πh = β(1− x z)
∫ θ¯
0
θ dθ + β(1− x)
∫ 1
θ¯
θ dθ − C(β). (4)
Note that it is extremely costly to exert effort with which a system will be compromised
with certainty. In contrast, when the hacker exerts no effort, he does not incur any cost. In
our model, we use the commonly used logarithmic cost function, C(β) = −M log(1 − β),
for the hacker to exert effort and attain the probability of success β. Here M is the cost of
exerting effort. Substituting for C(β) in equation (4) and integrating by parts, we obtain
Πh = β (1−x z)
(
θ¯−
∫ θ¯
0
F (θ) dθ
)
+β(1−x) ((1− θ¯F (θ¯))−∫ 1
θ¯
F (θ) dθ
)
+M log(1−β). (5)
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3.2 Vendor’s Profit Function
Since we have normalized the total number of users to one, the demand that the vendor
encounters for its software, η, is
η = 1− F (θ¯). (6)
The vendor is assumed to incur a negligible marginal cost to produce the software. How-
ever, the vendor incurs a cost K(x) in order to improve the patch quality and decrease the
effective vulnerability of a patched system. As a result, the software vendor maximizes the
following profit function:
max
p,x,z
ηp−K(x). (7)
The term ηp corresponds to the revenue that the vendor generates from selling the product
to legal users at price p. In addition to maximizing the price and patch quality, the vendor
decides whether or not to restrict access to the patch to only legal users.
Similar to hacker’s cost function, we use logarithmic cost function K(x) = −L log(1−x)
for the vendor. The vendor incurs L for achieving patch quality x.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We are ready to sketch the behavior of software users, the hacker, and the vendor when
the government chooses an exogenous level of anti-piracy effort α. As discussed, ex-post
government’s decision, we have a two-period model where the vendor sets the (p, x) pair as
well as chooses z in the first period, and both the hacker and users react in the second period.
An appropriate equilibrium concept for such games is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). We use backward induction in solving the game.
Therefore, we first solve for the reactions of the hacker and the software users for a given
(p, x, z) triplet. Next, we solve for the optimal price, patch quality, and patch distribution
decision. Finally, we calculate the welfare-metrics for each scenarios.
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Let us now characterize the hacker’s optimal action, β∗. The optimal hacker effort, β∗,
is a solution to the implicit equation (5) that requires some functional form assumption for
F (θ). For the sake of simplicity, we assume θ be distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1].
This implies that F (θ) = θ. Substituting for F (θ) and simplifying the equation, we obtain
Πh = β (1− x z)
(
θ¯ −
∫ θ¯
0
θ dθ
)
+ β(1− x) ((1− θ¯2)− ∫ 1
θ¯
θ dθ
)
+M log(1− β)
=
1
2
β
(
1 + x
(
θ¯2 − zθ¯2 − 1))+M log(1− β). (8)
To obtain the optimal effort level of the hacker (β∗), we take the first-order condition
on hacker’s expected profit expression (8), substitute θ¯ from (3), and solve the resulting
equation and simplify:
β
∗
=
2α (M + x− 1) + (1− 2M − p− x) x (1− z) + α (1− 2M − x) x z
2 (1− x) (x− α− (1− α) x z)
+
√
4 (1− x) (α (1− 2M − x) + p x (1− z)) (x− α− (1− α) x z) + (2α (M + x− 1) + (1− 2M − p− x) x (1− z)− αx (2M + x− 1) z)2
2 (1− x) (x− α− (1− α) x z)
.
Subsequently, substituting the optimal hacker effort β∗ in (3), we can compute the θ¯∗:
θ¯∗ =
√
2
√
p√
2αM+(1−2M−p−x) x (1−z)+α (1−2M−x) x z+
√
4 (1−x) (α (1−2M−x)+p x (1−z)) (x−α−(1−α) x z)+(2α (M+x−1)+(1−2M−p−x) x (1−z)+α (1−2M−x) x z)2
1−x
.
The following lemma follows from the optimal hacker strategy,
Lemma 1. ∀ M ∈ [1
2
,∞], β∗ ≤ 0.
Proof. By taking the first-order condition on hacker’s expected profit expression (8) and
solving for optimal β, we get
β = 1− 2M
1− x (1− (1− z)θ¯2) .
By imposing non-negativity constraint for β, and solving forM we obtain that β is always
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negative if
M >
1
2
(
1− x (1− (1− z)θ¯2)) .
This implies that irrespective of the value of x, z, or θ¯, for M > 1
2
, the optimal effort
exerted by the hacker is negative.
Lemma 1 provides an upper bound for hacker’s cost. If M > 1
2
, then the hacker exerts
negative effort, which is irrelevant for our analysis. Therefore, we only need to consider
M ∈ [0, 1
2
] for our analysis. Note that optimal hacker effort β∗ may be zero even when
M < 1
2
. Next, we use the second period consequence of first-period action and analyze
vendor’s optimal strategy. We analyze the two cases for z ∈ {0, 1} separately.
4.1 Patch is available to all users
The vendor maximizes η p + L log(1 − x) subject to the constraint that β∗ ≥ 0. Note
that when we maximize vendor’s profit expression (7), we need to ensure that the hacker
exerts non-negative effort in the equilibrium. By substituting θ¯∗, and setting z = 1 in these
expressions, we obtain vendor’s decision problem when the patch is available to everyone:
max
p,x
p− p
3/2√
α(2M + x)
+ L log(1− x)
s. t. 1− 2M
1− x ≥ 0.
We solve this maximization problem using Lagrangian optimization technique, and obtain
the following solutions:
p∗z=1 =


1
9
(8Mα + 4α− 27L) λ∗z=1 ≤ 0
4α
9
λ∗z=1 > 0
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and
x∗z=1 =


4α− 27L
4α
λ∗z=1 ≤ 0
1− 2M λ∗z=1 > 0
Here, λ∗z=1 =
8αM
27
−L, is the Lagrange multiplier. If λ∗z=1 ≤ 0, the constraint on β is not
binding. In other words, it implies that the hacker exerts a positive effort when λ∗z=1 ≤ 0,
and β∗z=1 = 0 otherwise.
The corresponding profit of the vendor when z = 1 is:
Πz=1v =


8Mα
27
+
4α
27
− L+ L log
(
27L
4α
)
β∗z=1 > 0
4α
27
+ L log(2M) β∗z=1 = 0
We observe the following properties in this (p∗z=1, x
∗
z=1) pair:
• Both p and x are increasing in α, the government’s anti-piracy measure (i.e., ∂p
∗
z=1
∂α
> 0
and
∂x∗
z=1
∂α
≥ 0).
• When the hacker exerts effort, as L increases (i.e., the cost of patch quality increases),
both p and x decreases (i.e.,
∂p∗
z=1
∂L
< 0 and
∂x∗
z=1
∂L
< 0).
• The effect of M on x varies depending on whether the constraint on β is binding
or not. If the hacker exerts effort, the patch quality, x, provided by the vendor is
independent of the cost incurred by the hacker. It is so because the patch is available
to everyone (legal users and pirates). Hence, when the vendor influences the hacker’s
effort by altering x, it affects both legal users and pirates equally; thus it fails to create
a strategic advantage. Notice that, ceteris paribus, as x increases, the demand for
the legal software increases. However, if x increases, β∗z=1 decreases, which, in turn,
reduces the demand for legal software. Consequently, there is no benefit gained from
increasing x. Hence, the vendor does not change x with M .
• When β = 0, as M increases, the value of x decreases. In this case, the vendor only
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needs to maintain a patch quality that is sufficient to keep the hacker out the market.
Now, by substituting (p∗z=1,x
∗
z=1) pair and setting z = 1, we find the equilibrium hacker
effort:
β∗z=1 =


1− 8αM
27L
λ∗z=1 ≤ 0
0 otherwise
We observe the following properties in β∗z=1:
• The hacker’s effort, β∗z=1, is decreasing in M (i.e., the cost of exerting hacking effort).
• As α increases (i.e., the anti-piracy effort intensifies), the optimal hacking effort level
decreases. This is because with increasing α, the vendor has a higher incentive to
provide a better quality patch, thus makes hacking more difficult.
• Finally, as L increases (i.e., the cost of patch quality increases), β∗z=1 increases.
Note that by the construction of the model x ∈ [0, 1]. The following Lemma follows
immediately:
Lemma 2. ∀ L ∈ [0, 4α
27
], 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof. By assumption, x cannot be less than zero. Thus, when β∗z=1 > 0, by imposing
non-negativity constraint on x and solving for L we get,
x∗z=1 ≥ 0
⇒ 4α− 27L
4α
≥ 0
⇒ L ≤ 4α
27
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4.2 Patch is available to only legal users
In this section, we analyze the case where the vendor restricts the access to the patch to
only legal users. In optimizing the profit expression (7), in the equilibrium, we once again
need to ensure that the hacker exerts non-negative effort. By substituting θ¯∗ , and setting
z = 0 in (7) and (8), we get:
max
p,x
p

1−
√
2
√
p√
x2+2Mx+px−x−2αM+
√
4α2M2−4αx(2M+p+x−1)M+x2(4M2+4(p+x−1)M+(p−x+1)2)
x−1

 + L log(1− x)
s. t.
2α(1−M − x)− x+ x(2M + p+ x)−
√
4α2M2 − 4αx(2M + p+ x− 1)M + x2 (4M2 + 4(p+ x− 1)M + (p− x+ 1)2)
2(1− x)(α− x) ≥ 0
This optimization problem is analytically intractable.5 As a result, we use numerical
analysis to characterize the properties of the optimal (p, x) pair and to subsequently provide
intuitions. Fortunately, Lemmas (1) and (2) provide bounds on M and L. In addition, by
the construction of the model, α, p, and x are each in the range [0, 1]. Therefore, we have a
compact solution space, which enables us to search the entire solution space and determine
the optimal (p, x) for any given triplet {α,M , L}.
In the numerical analysis, both α and M were initialized to be 0.01, and each were
incremented in steps of 0.01. Recall that the maximum value of L is limited to 4α
27
. In order
to study the effect of L for low values of α, we choose to increment L in steps of 0.001.
Finally, p and x were initialized to be 0.01, and were incremented by 0.01 at each step. For
a given {α, M , L}, we determine the optimal (p, x) pair that maximizes the vendor’s profit
requiring β∗ to be non-negative. If β∗ was non-positive, we computed the vendor’s profit by
substituting β = 0 in (3) and using this value in (7). Thus, for each combination of {α,M ,
and L}, we computed 100 ∗ 100 = 10, 000 values of vendor profit and picked the maximum
profit.6 The (p, x) pair that leads to this maximum profit is the approximate equilibrium
5We took first-order condition of the objective function with respect to p and x, ignoring the constraint.
Even without considering the constraint, we found that the degree of the polynomial is 5
2
.
6We used Matlab 7.1 to determine the optimal price and quality pair as well as other values. We
could not search the solution space at further granular level due to the time requirement of the algorithm.
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price and patch quality for the respective values of {α , M , L}. Algorithm 1 provides a
sketch of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Numerical Analysis
for all α such that 0.01 ≤ α ≤ 1 {increment by 0.01 at each step} do
for all M such that 0.01 ≤M ≤ 1
2
{increment by 0.01 at each step} do
for all L such that 0.001 ≤ L ≤ 4α
27
{increment by 0.001 at each step} do
for all p such that 0.01 ≤ p ≤ 1 {increment by 0.01 at each step} do
for all x such that 0.01 ≤ x ≤ 1 {increment by 0.01 at each step} do
if β∗z=0 > 0 then
PROFITLIST ← evaluated objective function value, α, M , L, p, and x
else
PROFITLIST ← computed vendor’s profit by substituting β = 0 in (3)
and using this value in (7), α, M , L, p, and x
end if
end for
end for
index = find the maximum profit from PROFITLIST
EQUILIBRIUM ← PROFITLIST [index] {the associated (p, x) with the index
is the optimal pair for the {α,M,L} triplet}
end for
end for
end for
Notice that this algorithm is not dependent on the value of z. So, we validated the
algorithm by verifying the outcome of our algorithm with the analytical results when z = 1.
Then we repeated the algorithm for z = 0.
We observe from our numerical analysis that sensitivity of p∗z=0,x
∗
z=0, and β
∗
z=0 with
respect to α and L are directionally similar in nature to the case when z = 0. More
specifically, as the anti-piracy effort intensifies, the software vendor has the incentive to
increase the price as well as the patch quality. This is intuitive, because intense anti-piracy
effort forces users to obtain a legal version and allows the vendor to strategically benefit from
the differentiation between the legal and the pirated version. Also, as more users switch to
legal version due to anti-piracy effort, the hacker generates less benefit. This is because
more users are protected with the patch. If the cost of patch quality, L, increases, the patch
Notwithstanding, we do not expect any changes in the qualitative nature of the intuition gained from the
current analysis.
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quality declines; consequently, the hacker benefits from increases in L.
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(c) Optimal Price: High anti-piracy effort (α =
0.93, L = 0.01)
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(d) Optimal Profit: High anti-piracy effort (α =
0.93, L = 0.01)
Figure 1: Effect of Hacker’s cost on Optimal Price and Profit with Low Cost of Patch Quality.
Before we analyze the role ofM , it is important to understand the effects of β. As such, β
decreases the consumer surplus which the vendor can potentially extract. We call this effect
the “adverse effect” of hacking. However, β also serves to vertically differentiate the legal
version from the pirated version and aids the vendor. Recall that without the patch, the
effect of β is more on CSp(θi) than CSb(θi). We call this effect the “countervailing effect”of
hacking. As the hacker’s cost M increases, as expected of β, the hacker exerts less effort.
Interestingly, the effect of M on the optimal vendor strategy is moderated by the cost of
patch quality, L and the government’s anti-piracy effort, α. We find that if L is low, then
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the vendor can exploit the hacker for its strategic benefit. In this case, the vendor exploits
the countervailing incentive of hacking to create higher differentiation. The vendor ensures
the dominance of countervailing incentive of hacking over the adverse effect of hacking by
providing a high quality patch to legal users. In contrast, if L is high, the vendor does
not have incentive to use the hacker strategically. This surprising result ensues from the
dominance of adverse effect of hacking over the countervailing benefit of hacking when L is
high.
Independent of α, when the cost of patch quality, L, is low , the optimal price decreases
initially with the increase inM and then increases (see Figure 17). The hacker exerts a good
amount of effort when M is low, and the vendor enjoys countervailing effect on p∗z=0. Note
that high hacker effort implies that users are at high risk of incurring a loss. In such a case,
by providing a good patch, the vendor can increase the expected consumer surplus. This, in
turn, allows the vendor to charge high price. However, as hacker’s effort decreases (i.e., M
increases), the attractiveness of the patch diminishes.
Even for low values of L, the vendor’s profit variation due toM is influenced by α. When
α is low, users tend to opt for the pirated version. Consequently, p∗z=0 declines. However,
at lower prices, users have the incentive to obtain the legal version; therefore, once the price
declines enough, consumers opt for the legal version. Once the hacker relinquishes his activity
(at high M), the vendor can focus on extracting consumer surplus without considering the
impact of hacker’s action. Consequently, the vendor increases the price. Figure 1(a) shows
the variation in the optimal price for a low value of cost of patch quality and low anti-piracy
effort level. In this case, vendor’s profit also exhibits a similar pattern as price. The profit
decreases due to declining price and decreasing demand. Profit bounces back for high M
because of the effect of mitigated hacking activity on price.
On the other hand, if α is high, the vendor takes advantage of intense anti-piracy effort.
In this circumstance, a declining price attracts more users to opt for the legal version. This
7Note that we have examined a number of cases to validate/invalidate our observations. For brevity, we
have included only representative figures to demonstrate our observations.
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allows the vendor to increase profit despite a declining price. With sufficiently high M ,
the hacker’s effort becomes minimal (or non-existent); subsequently, the vendor focuses on
keeping the hacker out of the market and extracting consumer surplus. This can be seen in
Figure 1(c).
In contrast, if the cost of patch quality, L, is high , the cost saving from decrease in
the patch quality is substantial. In this case, the vendor cannot afford to provide a patch
to legal users that is sufficient to ensure dominance of countervailing incentive of hacking
over adverse effect of hacking in the presence of high anti-piracy effort. Not surprisingly, the
vendor does not strategically benefit from hacking activity and prefers to dissuade the hacker
completely (similar to the scenario where patch is available to everyone). As a result, as M
increases, both the optimal price and profit increase. The following remark summarizes the
aforementioned observation:
Remark 4.1. When the patch is only provided to legal users, hacker’s activity provides
strategic benefit to the vendor if the cost of patch quality is low.
4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we focus on comparing the outcome of the two strategies - (i) releasing the
patch to everyone, i.e., z = 1, or (ii) providing the patch to only legal users, i.e., z = 0.
Let us consider the impact of anti-piracy effort. As observed, anti-piracy effort has similar
directional effect on the outcomes of both strategies. However, the magnitude of the effect
is different for z = 0 and z = 1.
Remark 4.2. (i) When the anti-piracy effort is low, the vendor provides better quality patch
and charges higher price if the patch is only distributed to legal users.
(ii) For low α, the vendor profit is higher for z = 0 compare to z = 1.
Remark 4.2 can be explained as follow. Recall that both α and β serve to vertically
differentiate between the legal and the pirated versions, although β’s effect exists only when
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z = 0. For low α, the differentiation from β is exploited, and the vendor’s profits are higher.
When the government exerts mild anti-piracy effort, keeping the hacking effect constant on
all users, users generate relatively decent amount of surplus from the pirated version. As
a result, if the patch is provided to everyone, the vendor does not benefit greatly when
the anti-piracy effort is low. However, if the patch is only given to legal users, hacking
activity also serves to differentiate. As mentioned earlier, hacking has adverse effect as well
as countervailing effect. If the pirates have a large surplus, it is optimal for the vendor
to strategically use the hacker to marginalize the pirates while protecting the legal users
through a good quality patch. In this case, marginal benefit of differentiating through
hacking activity dominates the adverse effect of hacking. As such, the countervailing effect
of hacking is significant. Thus, vendor’s action to thwart piracy through restricting access to
the patch to only legal users complements government’s anti-piracy action. In other words,
the vendor generates higher profit by setting z = 0 when the anti-piracy effort α is low.
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Figure 2: Optimal Hacker’s Effort - Effect of α.
It is obvious that as α increases, the vendor has lesser incentive to use β to differentiate.
So, it tries to decrease the hacking activity as β has an adverse effect independent of the value
of z. Since, when z = 1, β only destroys the consumer surplus that the vendor can extract,
the vendor dissuades the hacking activity more aggressively when z = 1 than when z = 0.
This can be seen in Figure 2. More formally, if αˆ denotes the anti-piracy effort level when the
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hacker quits hacking, then αˆz = 1 ≤ αˆz = 0. This is because as anti-piracy effort intensifies,
when z = 1, all users have access to a better quality patch and the hacker gets marginalized.
In contrast, if z = 0, pirates do not have access to the patch, which incentivizes the hacker
to exert effort. Once the hacker quits, the vendor concentrates on keeping the hacker out
of the market and extracting consumer surplus. As a result, for intense anti-piracy effort
(α is high), the vendor takes full advantage of α as the product differentiator when z = 1.
In contrast, for z = 0, in addition to the α effect there exists hacker effect. Since high α
leaves negligible consumer surplus for pirated copy, the marginal benefit of hacking activity
as product differentiator is insignificant. However, the vendor needs to deal with the adverse
effect of hacking. Thus, the adverse effect dominates the countervailing effect of hacking for
high α. Consequently, setting z = 1 leads to higher price and profit than setting z = 0 when
anti-piracy effort is high.
Remark 4.3. (i) There exists an ~α such that ∀ α ∈ [~α, 1], the optimal price is higher when
the patch is released to every one compare to the optimal price when patch is made available
to only legal users.
(ii) There exists an α˜ such that ∀ α ∈ [α˜, 1], the optimal profit is higher when the patch is
released to every one compare to the optimal profit when patch is made available to only legal
users.
Remark 4.3 implies that, for sufficiently high α, the vendor may not benefit from vertical
differentiation achieved through restricted patch distribution (see Figure 3). This is an
interesting result in that quality differentiation does not create enough strategic advantage
for a monopolist. This stems from the fact that the interaction between the consumer and
the vendor is influenced by actions of two other entities, namely the government and the
hacker. As the hacker’s cost, M , increases, the critical value αˆ decreases. This implies that
the vendor will be encouraged to release patches to all users at even lower level of α when
the cost of hacking increases.
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics - Effect of α.
5 Social Welfare
In defining social welfare, we include the net benefits of all users and the vendor. In the same
spirit of Trumbull (1990), we exclude the hacker’s benefit and cost from the welfare measure.
Note that the payments made by the users to the vendor are transfers, and subsequently
cancel out in social welfare calculation. For the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly
consider the cost of exerting anti-piracy effort. Thus, social welfare simplifies to,
SW = (1− β(1− x z)) (1− α)
∫ θ¯
0
θ2 dθ + (1− β(1− x))
∫ 1
θ¯
θ2 dθ + L log(1− x)
=
1
3
(
1 − (α + (x(z(α− 1) + 1)− α)β)θ¯3 + (x− 1)β)+ L log(1− x). (9)
The objective of a social planner is to maximize the social welfare. In doing so, the
government needs to choose an appropriate level of α or facilitate policies based on the
level of α it can exert. By substituting the appropriate optimal values of p, x, and β in
expression in (9), we can obtain SWz=0 and SWz=1, which are then compared. We observe
that for low values of α, it is social welfare improving to strategically exploit hacker’s action
(setting z = 0) (see Figure 4). It is intuitive to see that, if α = 0, there exists no market
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Figure 4: Social Welfare (M = 0.05, L = 0.01) .
in the absence of hacking activity and restriction on patch distribution. In other words,
if anti-piracy effort is extremely costly, then complementing the government’s action with
hacking activity through restricted patch availability is welfare improving. Nevertheless,
if the anti-piracy effort is costless, then the government can achieve optimal welfare by
choosing a moderate level of α and requiring the vendor to release the patch to everyone.
Since intense anti-piracy effort reduces the surplus of pirated copy users drastically, it is not
socially optimal to exert intense anti-piracy effort.
Remark 5.1. (i) If it is costly to exert anti-piracy effort, then strategically exploiting hack-
ing activity through restricting access to the patch to only legal users is social welfare im-
proving.
(ii) Maximum social welfare can be obtained by exerting a moderate level of anti-piracy effort
and requiring the vendor to release the patch to everyone.
Remark 5.1 has important implications for policy makers. Strikingly, it suggests that
hacking activity can be a complement of anti-piracy effort in improving social welfare. Real-
istically, the government may not have enough resources to exert sufficient anti-piracy effort.
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In such a case, the government should support restricting access to the patch to only legal
users. However, if the government can afford to actively pursue anti-piracy drive, then policy
makers should require software vendors to release the patch to all users and provide sufficient
product differentiation through anti-piracy effort.
6 Conclusion
Lately, software vendors are taking active role in thwarting piracy by restricting access to
security patches. As mentioned, one prominent example is Windows Genuine Program or the
upcoming Windows Vista. In this paper, we analyze the decision of a vendor to restrict the
access to the patch to only legal users. In doing so, we consider roles of both the government
(in the form of anti-piracy effort) and the hacker. We provide insights regarding the economic
as well as the policy implications of restricted patch distribution.
Our analysis demonstrates that if the cost of patch quality is high, then in the presence
of intense anti-piracy action the vendor does not benefit from quality differentiation (be-
tween legal version and pirated copy) implemented through restricting access to the patch.
This is because the countervailing incentive of hacking is negligible in such instance; more
specifically, the adverse effect of hacking dominates.
We also notice that there exists a level of anti-piracy effort by the government above
which vertically differentiating legitimate copy from pirated copy through restricted patch
distribution is not optimal. Rather, the vendor is better-off distributing the patch to all
users.
Interestingly, if the government is unable to exert anti-piracy effort (may be due to lack of
resources or high cost), we find that it is social welfare improving to restrict the access to the
patch to only legal users. This implies that for low level of anti-piracy effort, complementing
it with countervailing incentive of hacking is welfare improving. Notwithstanding, if the
government is free to choose an appropriate level of anti-piracy effort, then it is optimal to
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choose a moderate level of anti-piracy effort and require the vendor to release the patch to
all users.
Although our results provide interesting insights regarding the implications of restricted
patch distribution, our analysis is not without limitations. For simplicity, we use specific
functional forms for the users’s utilities, hacker’s profit, and vendor’s profit. It would be
interesting to use generalized functional forms in future. For the numerical analysis we had
to increment various parameters in steps of an arbitrary value (e.g., 0.01), which limited us
to finite number of cases. Also, it would be insightful to generalize the model to competitive
setting. One may consider that government can also exert effort to make hacking more
expensive. Such an extension to the current model will be useful. We also assume that
if the patch is available to the user, the user will patch the system. Also, implementing
the restricted patch distribution policy needs not be costless. Relaxing these assumptions
will lead to better understanding of the information security landscape. Another avenue of
interesting future research would be to empirically validate our model.
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